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Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom 
 
Stanley P. Williams Jr. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Criminal justice and bias cannot continue to coexist. Bias that infiltrates our 
criminal justice system may threaten the legitimacy of our courts. Bias that penetrates 
the criminal court unmistakably threatens innocent lives. This Paper invents a novel 
procedural solution, within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment, that confronts a long-
felt but unsolved need to eradicate bias in the criminal courtroom. It aims to 
revolutionize how criminal proceedings are conducted through a model that embodies 
our Founding Fathers' pursuit of impartiality while pitting longstanding dogma 
against scientific data. This Paper discusses how bias affects both judges and jurors, 
the drawbacks of current methods or proposals designed to address bias, and finally, 
draws a blueprint for a practical and immediate solution: The Double-Blind System. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Two hundred and thirty years ago, our Founders formed the basis for our 
Constitution, which sought to establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty for 
all Americans.1 No context evokes the palpable sense of justice and liberty in one 
setting like a courtroom that will decide whether one may be sentenced to 
imprisonment or death. The Founders appreciated this power and devoted the Sixth 
Amendment solely to criminal prosecutions.2 The Impartial Jury Clause contained in 
this Amendment—though not as reknown or contested as clauses found in the First 
or Second Amendments—deserves equal recognition.3  
Our inability to fulfill this obligation to impartiality is echoed by a juror’s 
statement that led to a recent sexual assault conviction: “I think he did it because 
he’s Mexican, and Mexican men take whatever they want.”4 Bias, seemingly like 
electricity, is neither created nor destroyed but simply transferred or changed from 
one form to another. In AD 54, it manifested itself in Nero’s persecution of 
                                                 
  Deputy District Attorney, Marin County, California. Email: https://cal.berkeley.edu/spw. The author 
thanks professors Wendy E. Wagner and Jennifer E. Laurin for their invaluable insight and feedback. 
The author also thanks the editors of the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, including 
Tristan Fretwell, Samuel Seeds, James Vandeventer, and Michele Wilcox-Petrites for their tireless 
work.  
1  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
2  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3  Id. 
4  Adam Liptak, Racial Bias Among Jurors at Heart of Supreme Court Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-case-on-juror-racial-bias.html.   
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Christians.5  In 1619, Jamestown, Virginia, planted the seeds of bias in America 
through the harvests of cotton and tobacco.6 In 1933 and 1942, bias concentrated 
people into camps in Auschwitz and California respectively.7 After our Towers fell on 
9/11, hate crimes against Muslims soared.8 The effects of explicit bias are undeniable, 
yet what happens to bias that is concealed or implicit? Ideally the walls of a courtroom 
would repel such biases. In reality, our current system enables them to enter the 
courtroom virtually unchecked. Our inability to curb these biases produces costs 
beyond undermining the legitimacy of convictions. The Supreme Court admits bias 
taints the jury selection process itself.9 Bias incurs further costs to taxpayers when 
trials must be retried: For instance, the national average cost of adjudicating a 
homicide is between $22,000 and $44,000.10 Other costs are not as easily measured, 
such as a victim who must relive a trial or the loss of public confidence in our criminal 
justice system. But what if those costs could be avoided? What if the unfulfilled 
promise from 1789, that “the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury  
. . . ,”11 could be delivered regardless of the era?  
This Paper addresses that long-felt need by inventing a novel procedural 
remedy for bias—proven to be effective—that can be implemented immediately. 
Therefore, the ambit of this Paper is limited to the adjudication stage and is confined 
to the walls of the courtroom. It addresses biases that affect jurors and judges, 
explains how our system currently addresses bias, and describes a method to prevent 
current and future biases. This solution is constitutional, practical, and may serve as 
one step toward achieving much-needed criminal justice reform. 
 
I. BIAS 
 
In its colloquial form, bias is a loose, umbrella term. Unspecified claims of bias 
may be levelled against others, such as when Donald Trump said, in reference to a 
federal district court judge, “He's got bias.”12 Scholars may identify cognitive biases, 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Nero, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/nero (last visited Feb. 26, 
2017). 
6  See, e.g., Slavery in America, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/slavery (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
7  See, e.g., DAN STONE, CONCENTRATION CAMPS:  A SHORT HISTORY (2017). 
8  Eric Lichtblau, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Most Since Post-9/11 Era, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html. 
9  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (holding that the same equal protection principles as 
are applied to determine whether there is discrimination in selecting the venire also govern the State’s 
use of peremptory challenges to strike individual jurors from the petit jury). See generally Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that exclusion of black jurors violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
10   Priscillia Hunt, James Anderson & Jessica Saunders, The Price of Justice: New National and State-
Level Estimates of the Judicial and Legal Costs of Crime to Taxpayers, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 231–254 
(2016). 
11  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
12  Tom Kertscher, Donald Trump’s Racial Comments About Federal Hispanic Judge in Trump University 
Case, POLITIFACT (June 8, 2016, 4:29 PM), 
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such as availability bias.  Accordingly, we must clarify terms used in this Paper at 
the outset to reduce confusion: 
  
1) Explicit biases are attitudes or stereotypes that one consciously endorses.13  
 
2) Concealed biases are explicit biases that one hides from others in order to 
adjust to society’s mores.14  
 
3) Implicit biases are attitudes or stereotypes that one unwittingly holds, 
whether or not one endorses those beliefs.15 
 
A. Implicit Bias 
 
The concept of implicit bias warrants a prelude because it is a relatively new 
concept. Implicit bias is real.16 In fact, an overwhelming majority of scientists and 
professors agree it exists beyond a reasonable doubt after producing hundreds of peer-
reviewed articles and replicated studies.17 Implicit bias derives from more than a 
century-old foundation of cognitive research and fits the contemporary consensus 
that a vast amount of cognition “occurs automatically, effortlessly, and outside of 
conscious awareness.”18 Although this cognition is subconscious, it can be tested just 
like a doctor might test other subconscious processes, like heart rate or body 
temperature. Instead of using a thermometer, however, scientists use the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) for implicit biases.19 The IAT measures how quickly someone 
pairs a description with another entity.20 The amount of time it takes to pair a word 
with an adjective indicates a positive or negative mental association with the word.21 
IAT results, including their construct and predictive validity, are corroborated by 
physiological and psychophysiological evidence.22 Notably, implicit biases that arise 
out of positive or negative mental associations can be linked with virtually anything, 
                                                 
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2016/jun/08/donald-trumps-racial-comments-about-judge-
trump-un/.  
13  Jerry Kang, Mark Bennet, Devon Carbado & Pam Casey, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 1124, 1132 (2012).  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1129. 
16 Cf. John T. Jost, Laurie Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser & 
Curtis D. Hardin, The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of 
Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager 
Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORG’L BEHAV. 39, 42 (2009).  
17 See id. at 42–43. 
18 Id. at 43. 
19 Id. at 45; see also Flower-Insect IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/user/agg/blindspot/indexflowerinsect.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 
2017) (online version of the IAT). 
20  See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 39 
(2013). 
21  See id. 
22  Jost et al., supra note 17, at 45.  
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including one’s own race or sexual orientation.23 In other words, an Irishman could 
hold subconscious negative beliefs about the Irish while extolling Brits.  
Consistent mental associations, which develop into implicit or explicit biases, 
are established as early as childhood and are cemented over a lifetime.24 According 
to developmental psychology research, kindergarteners show the same implicit racial 
biases that adults in their culture hold.25 One study revealed that within minutes, 
children exposed to fictitious groups with varying socioeconomic statuses discerned 
which groups were wealthier, and, in turn, the children revealed a preference for the 
wealthier groups. 26   After a few weeks, mere demarcations of gender—such as 
teachers labeling children as “boys” or “girls”—led preschoolers and elementary 
students to believe boys, but not girls, should become scientists.27 Children also retain 
antisocial actions or threatening cues more easily than comparable positive actions.28 
For instance, if children learn that refugees pose a danger to their society while also 
learning about instances of refugees who contribute to their society, the children will 
retain information about the dangerous refugees in greater detail.29 This makes sense 
under an evolutionary framework: our survival should depend more upon discerning 
the alligator that eats people in greater detail than the fly-eating lizard.  
Evolved traits may not translate perfectly into modern culture: constant 
alertness, or insomnia, may have saved our ancient ancestors from nightly threats,30 
but it sabotages our success on presentations. Similarly, our instincts for fear might 
misfire in the modern age and sabotage our trial verdicts.  
To better understand the universal trait of fear, let’s consider one of the most 
commonly feared things by adults: snakes.31 Most people who share this fear probably 
have had no prior direct interaction with a snake to warrant such a strong fear. 
                                                 
23  SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT PRESIDENTS, CONTROL 
MARKETS, WAGE WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES 74 (2010) (“Just as black children tend to have positive 
associations with white faces rather than with black faces, gay people can unconsciously harbor the 
same associations as straight people.”). 
24  Yarrow Dunham & Mahzarin Banaji, The Development of Implicit Intergroup Cognition, 12 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 248, 252 (2008). 
25 Id. at 250.  
26 See Suzanne R. Horwitz, Kristin Shutts & Kristina R. Olson, Social Class Differences Produce Social 
Group Preferences, 17 DEV. SCI. 991, 995 (2014). 
27  Rebecca S. Bigler, The Role of Classification Skill in Moderating Environmental Influences on 
Children’s Gender Stereotyping: A Study of the Functional Use of Gender in the Classroom, 66 CHILD 
DEV. 1072, 1079–80, 1083 (1995); Lacey J. Hilliard & Lynn S. Liben, Differing Levels of Gender Salience 
in Preschool Classrooms: Effects on Children’s Gender Attitudes and Intergroup Bias, 81 CHILD 
DEV. 1787, 1794 (2010). 
28 See Nicole C. Baltazar, Kristin Shutts & Katherine D. Kinzler, Children Show Heightened Memory for 
Threatening Social Actions, 112 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 102, 107 (2012). 
29 Id. 
30  See Melissa Bateson, Ben Brilot & Daniel Nettle, Anxiety: An Evolutionary Approach, 56 CAN. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 707, 711 (2011); see also Louise Atkinson, Trouble Sleeping? The Solution Could Lie in our 
Ancestors’ Lifestyle and Taking Rests Like a Caveman, DAILY MAIL, (May 18, 2010, 4:18 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1279204/Trouble-sleeping-The-solution-lie-ancestors-lifestyle-
taking-rests-like-caveman.html.  
31  Cat Thrasher & Vanessa LoBue, Do Infants Find Snakes Aversive? Infants’ Physiological Responses to 
“Fear-Relevant” Stimuli, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 382, 382 (2016). 
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Scientists have shown this fear is not innate, but rather, is acquired.32 Fear that is 
not innate may be acquired two ways: through direct experience or indirectly through 
social observation or communication. 33  So why do so many people fear snakes? 
Studies have shown babies and very young children show a predisposition to fear 
snakes based merely on a few bad direct experiences or even indirectly via negative 
portrayals in media.34 Shifting to our court system, such de minimis exposure might 
lead people to fear an African American or a Muslim defendant based solely on one 
bad experience or mere news coverage.  
The idea that media may indirectly undermine trial impartiality is not a new 
concept. In 1966, the Supreme Court stated, “Given the pervasiveness of modern 
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of 
the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is 
never weighed against the accused.”35 This rationale for a change in venue is well 
suited for ephemeral but intense media coverage regarding one accused individual: 
for instance, a trial that resembles that of Timothy McVeigh. But the doctrine does 
not address pervasive or subtle forms of biases, and yet those can be equally 
damaging. Consider biases that arise for a group after similarly intense but 
ephemeral coverage of, for example, 9/11; according to Gallup polls, distrust of Arabs 
in America has steadily increased after 9/11.36 The doctrine also fails to address 
vestigial attitudes that remain after institutional practices, which are often paired 
with deliberate propaganda. Widely distributed pro-slavery propaganda in America 
included purported support from the Bible, the Constitution, economists, and 
scientific data that claimed Negroes were mentally and physically inferior to the 
white race.37  
  Implicit bias may help explain the staggering differences between, for example, 
African Americans and other ethnicities in regard to African-American experience 
with the criminal justice system. African Americans are more likely to (1) have their 
                                                 
32  Id. at 388.  
33  Andreas Olsson, Katherine I. Nearing & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Learning Fears by Observing Others: The 
Neural Systems of Social Fear Transmission, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 3, 3 (2007). 
34  Clara Moskowitz, Why We Fear Snakes, LIVE SCIENCE, (Mar. 3, 2008, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.livescience.com/2348-fear-snakes.html.  
35  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
36  Costas Panagopoulos, The Polls-Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of 
9/11, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 608, 613, 624 (2006). 
37  Albert Deutsch, The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840) and Its Use as Pro-Slavery Propaganda, 
15 BULL. HIST. MED. 469, 469 (1944); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 14-981) (Indeed in 2015, Justice Scalia surmised, “[T[here are those 
who contend that it does not benefit African-Americans to . . . get them into the University of Texas 
[Austin] where they do not do well, as opposed to having them go to a less advanced school, a less—a 
slower track school where they do well.”). But see Michael McGough, Opinion, No, Scalia’s Comment 
About “Less-Advanced” Schools Wasn’t Racist, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:51 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-scalia-affirmativeaction-supremecourt-20151209-
story.html (“[I]t’s equally silly to suggest that Scalia was being racist when he clumsily invoked the 
mismatch theory.”); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by “Bell Curve” Author at 
Vermont College, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/middlebury-
college-charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html (“‘The Bell Curve,’ published in 1994, linked lower socio-
economic status with race and intelligence.”).   
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cars searched; (2) be arrested for drug use; (3) be jailed while awaiting trial; (4) be 
offered a plea deal that includes prison time; (5) be excluded from juries because of 
their race; (6) serve longer sentences than white Americans for the same offense; (7) 
be disenfranchised because of a felony conviction; and (8) have their probation 
revoked. 38  Generally, one in three African-American males is likely to become 
incarcerated at some point, as opposed to Caucasian males, who face a chance of one 
in seventeen.39 
To demonstrate how pervasive and pernicious implicit bias can be, let’s take a 
momentary step away from the adversarial system of criminal law and examine two 
fields where all parties’ interests are aligned: healthcare and education. Both fields 
demonstrate negative implicit biases that providers may not consciously endorse but 
nonetheless act on, producing harmful or even lethal effects.  
Preschool teachers—both black and white—scrutinized black children more 
closely than white children when asked to spot challenging behavior, though, in 
reality, the children never displayed misbehavior because they were child actors.40 
The Department of Education found black preschool children are over three times 
more likely to be suspended from school than white preschool children. 41  These 
findings suggest that implicit biases held by preschool teachers may have tangible 
effects on students, despite teachers’ best intentions.  
Some doctors and other healthcare providers hold strong implicit biases 
towards obese patients.42 This increases the chances of a diagnosis bias, which may 
hinder doctors’ ability to reevaluate initial value judgments once they have made 
them. When one patient told her doctor she was unable to breathe, the doctor 
responded, “That’s the problem with obesity. . . . Have you ever considered going on 
a diet?”43  Subsequent tests revealed that patient’s symptoms stemmed from life-
threatening blood clots in her lungs.44  As a second patient began to explain her 
                                                 
38   Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to Be Black in the Criminal Justice System, SLATE (Aug. 9, 
2015, 12:11 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/08/racial_disparities_in_the_criminal_justi
ce_system_eight_charts_illustrating.html (showing eight charts that show how the justice system is 
stacked against black Americans).  
39  Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration/racial-
disparities-criminal-justice (last visited Feb 20, 2017). 
40  Walter S. Gilliam, Angela N. Maupin, Chin R. Reyes, Maria Accavitti & Frederick Shic, Do Early 
Educators’ Implicit Biases Regarding Sex and Race Relate to Behavior Expectations and 
Recommendations of Preschool Expulsions and Suspensions?, YALE CHILD STUD. CTR. 1, 5–7 (2016), 
http://www.addressingracialmicroaggressions.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Preschool-Implicit-Bias-
Policy-Brief_final_9_26_276766_5379.pdf.  
41  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, A First Look: Key Data Highlights on Equity and 
Opportunity Gaps in Our Nation’s Public Schools 1, 3 (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf.  
42  S.M. Phelan, D.J. Burgess, M.W. Yeazel, W.L. Hellerstedt, J.M. Griffin & M. van Ryn, Impact of Weight 
Bias and Stigma on Quality of Care and Outcomes for Patients with Obesity, 16 OBESITY REVS. 319, 
320–21 (2015). 
43  Gina Kolata, Why Do Obese Patients Get Worse Care? Many Doctors Don’t See Past the Fat, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sep. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/health/obese-patients-health-care.html. 
44  See id. 
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symptoms, the doctor cut her off, saying, “Let me cut to the chase. You need to lose 
weight.”45 The doctor diagnosed that second patient with “obesity pain;” however, 
practitioners later discovered her symptoms resulted from a condition that was not 
caused by obesity.46  Considering that almost 70 percent of American adults are 
considered to be overweight or obese,47 implicit bias may cause caregivers to forgo 
life-saving measures despite their earnest efforts to heal. 
 
B. Judicial Bias 
 
Just as doctors take a Hippocratic Oath to do no harm, judges take an oath to 
administer justice impartially.48 When asked, 97 percent of judges placed themselves 
in an above average category when ranking their ability to “avoid racial prejudice in 
decision-making” relative to other judges in their conference. 49  Of course, those 
estimates are impossible, since 97 percent of one group, by definition, cannot fit in 
the top 50 percent. Justice Kennedy once explained, “Bias is easy to attribute to 
others and difficult to discern in oneself.”50  
A study including over one-hundred actual judges—both appointed and elected 
judges—from three different jurisdictions revealed judges do harbor implicit racial 
biases.51 Just like other black adults generally, black judges individually varied in 
their preference for white or black individuals.52 White judges demonstrated implicit 
white preferences on par with the general population and capital defense attorneys.53 
Importantly, these implicit biases held by judges of disparate backgrounds translate 
into tangible effects.54 Judges with strong white preferences gave harsher judgments 
to black defendants when subliminally primed.55 Alternatively, judges with strong 
black preferences were more lenient with black defendants when subliminally 
primed.56 Other recent research has shown that judges consistently exhibit negative 
in-group biases; when a black judge rules on a black defendant or a white judge rules 
on a white defendant, the sentences are 14 percent longer than when ruling on a 
defendant of an out-group.57 Despite swearing to administer justice impartially and 
                                                 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Overweight and Obesity Statistics, 
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-statistics/Pages/overweight-obesity-statistics.aspx 
(last visited Feb 20, 2017).  
48  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012). 
49  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Bias 
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225–26 (2009). 
50  Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016).  
51  Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1221. 
52  Id. at 1199-1200, 1221. 
53  Id. at 1222.  
54  Id. at 1197. 
55  Id. at 1223.  
56  Id. But see id. at 1223 (showing that when race is explicitly manipulated, however, judges show the 
capacity to treat defendants comparably). 
57  Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Discovered a New and Surprising Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice 
System, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2016), 
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undoubtedly attempting to do so in good faith, judges were incapable of acting 
impartially when primed with everyday situations.58  
Even if the aforementioned biases exist, one may argue a guilty or innocent 
verdict depends on the jury, not the judge who just calls balls and strikes. Since the 
jury cannot telepathically read the mind of a judge, a judge’s internal biases should 
have no practical effect on verdicts. In reality, a judge’s unspoken biases may 
influence a jury; study participants who were blind to the result of a trial accurately 
predicted jury verdicts based solely on the judge’s verbal and nonverbal cues.59  
Many variables of a judge’s background—including, “among others, age, sex, 
race, political ideology, and number of years on the bench”—affect judicial behavior 
toward trial participants. 60  In turn, the interplay of these variables that affect 
behavior may directly affect jury deliberations. 61  Judicial behavior stems from 
expectations of cases based on numerous factors; however, one salient factor that 
carries no legal significance is the defendant’s socioeconomic status.62 Yet, judges 
tended to infer guilt when defendants came from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.63 
Additionally, when judges faced defendants from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, 
study participants deemed the judges’ nonverbal behavior to be more professional 
and competent.64  
 
C. Juror Bias 
 
Jury deliberations are black boxes by design so that discussions remain secret, 
which promotes juror impartiality, privacy, and candidness. In 2010, a room of jurors 
tasked with deciding a sexual assault case turned dark for entirely different reasons.  
One juror, a former law enforcement officer, told fellow jurors, “I think he did it 
because he’s Mexican, and Mexican men take whatever they want.”65 He continued, 
“[N]ine times out of 10” Mexican men were guilty of “being aggressive toward women 
and young girls” because of a Mexican “sense of entitlement [and] bravado.”66 After 
just two jurors broke their code of silence to report these remarks that occurred during jury 
deliberations, the Supreme Court wrestled with the need to preserve the privacy of jury 
                                                 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/24/researchers-have-discovered-a-surprising-
racial-bias-in-the-criminal-justice-system/?utm_term=.51cdaffd9f8; Briggs Depew, Ozkan Eren & Naci 
H. Mocan, Judges, Juveniles and In-Group Bias (NBER, Working Paper No. w22003, Feb. 2016),  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2736079.  
58  See, Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1225.  
59  See, Peter Blanck, Robert Rosenthal & LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ 
Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 136–37 (1985). 
60  Id. at 104. 
61  See id. at 136–37.  
62  Id. at 121.  
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 128. 
65  Liptak, supra note 4.   
66  Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Debates Juror Bias, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2016),  
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2016/10/samuel_alito_is_mo
re_worried_about_pc_run_amok_than_a_blatantly_racist_jury.html.  
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deliberations while upholding the values of impartial justice.67 The Court ruled in 
this case that the secrecy of jury deliberations may be pierced in instances of “overt 
racial bias.”68 Yet, the Court provided no standard “for determining when evidence of 
racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside and a new trial be 
granted.”69 
If the former officer held this belief to himself, would that conviction be any 
more just? What if the officer was unknowingly biased against Mexicans and voted 
for a guilty verdict? What if all twelve jurors said in unison, “He did it because he’s 
Mexican” and delivered a guilty verdict? Our current system fails to account for these 
respective situations of concealed biases, implicit biases, and explicit biases that go 
unreported. Undoubtedly, this former officer swore during voir dire that he would act 
impartially. This illuminates that a concealed bias may become an explicit bias based 
on who is listening. One could argue this is an isolated incident. On the other hand, 
the sign of one roach may indicate many more hiding and multiplying. 
Listing a taxonomy of these roaches—or biases—is unnecessary, as biases held 
by juries encompass all human bias, which has been discussed ad nauseum in other 
books and publications.70 Rather than listing all of these biases, let’s consider some 
biases that uniquely arise in a courtroom.  
During the course of a trial, jurors noticed the defendant fastidiously drawing 
on pieces of paper as he looked toward the jury box.71 As the trial proceeded, one juror 
finally approached the judge with some concern.72 The juror told the judge that she 
felt uncomfortable because the defendant was drawing pictures of the jurors’ faces.73 
In fact, when questioned, other jurors admitted feeling anxious about the drawings 
and felt the drawings were inappropriate.74 The judge told the jurors the drawings 
were permissible and did not resemble them.75 The judge then asked the jurors, “Can 
you remain fair and impartial?”76 The jurors responded, “yes,” and later convicted the 
defendant.77 Unlike the 2010 case in which two jurors came forward, no jurors broke 
the silence of the jurors’ deliberations. So we will never know if in addition to asking, 
“is he guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” one or more jurors asked, “if we find him 
not guilty, does he get to keep our portraits?”  
A few questions arise: First, were jurors able to anxiously watch the defendant 
draw them while simultaneously weighing the credibility of testifying witnesses, 
weighing the evidence presented, and following all rulings on objections? Second, why 
were the jurors observing the defendant at all? Certainly, his drawings or expressions 
                                                 
67  See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017). 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at 870. 
70  See generally,, DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
71  United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1478 (6th Cir. 1991). 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  See id. 
77  See id. at 1471, 1478.  
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had no impact on the legal merits of the evidence. Third, did the drawings make the 
jurors fearful of setting the defendant free?  
Consider another case involving a rape allegation. Naturally, the jurors swore 
at the outset that they could rule impartially on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. 
The female victim recounted how she had been drugged and raped by three men in 
succession.78 What sets this case apart from others is not the “not guilty” verdict. 
Rather, it is the fact that all eight jurors were smiling and posing for photos with one 
of the defendants after trial.79 This defendant was a first-round draft pick in the 
National Basketball Association (NBA), was Rookie of the Year, and was named the 
NBA’s Most Valuable Player. 80  He was Derrick Rose. Lest you suspect some 
impropriety, the jurors made clear, “Rose’s stardom as one of the NBA’s most 
prominent point guards played no role in their decision.”81 
In the first case, the idea of a photo produced shock; however, in the second 
case, it produced selfies. What unifies the two cases is one question: what legal 
purpose does the juror’s view of the defendant serve if the defendant never testifies? 
Better yet, why is the defendant present at all?  
Put simply, the defendant’s presence is generally optional. The defendant’s 
right to be present at his or her trial stems from the Confrontation Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and various statutes.82 The key rights include the right of cross-
examination, the right of face-to-face confrontation, and the defendant’s right to be 
present at his or her trial. 83  The first Supreme Court decision to interpret the 
Confrontation Clause stated the clause’s primary objective was “to prevent 
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . [from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of 
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness.”84 Historically, such ex 
parte affidavits infamously led to the death of many who never had the opportunity 
to question their accusers, as exemplified by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.85 The 
court sentenced Raleigh to death for treason. The crucial evidence against him was 
out-of-court statements by a witness who never appeared in court to testify, despite 
Raleigh’s claims that the witness lied to save himself.86  
Accordingly, the defendant’s most basic right under the Confrontation Clause 
is “to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the defendant’s trial.”87 By being 
                                                 
78  Joel Rubin, Jury Finds Claim that NBA Star Derrick Rose and Two Friends Sexually Assaulted Woman 
Not Credible, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-derrick-rose-verdict-
20161019-snap-story.html.  
79  Id. 
80  Derrick Rose, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/nba/player/_/id/3456/derrick-rose (last visited Sep. 17, 2017). 
81  Rubin, supra note 78.  
82  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“the accused shall enjoy the right to… be confronted with the 
witnesses against him”); Cal. Penal Code § 977 (“The accused may execute a written waiver of his or 
her right to be personally present…”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.04 (“A defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor may … be excused from attendance at any or all proceedings”).  
83  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004). 
84  Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). 
85  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  
86  Id. 
87  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). 
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present, the defendant is able to defend against accusations and confront witnesses. 
Thus, the Confrontation Clause does not protect the defendant’s presence per se; 
rather it protects it as a means to an end. Yet even in 1895, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that this general rule, however valuable to the defendant, “must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the 
case.”88  
Courts originally inferred in dicta—apparently as an outgrowth of the right to 
be present—a right of face-to-face confrontation.89 Later, the Supreme Court held 
that the “Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with 
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”90 Notably, a face-to-face requirement is 
not written in the Constitution.91 Scalia stated face-to-face interactions help ensure 
the integrity of the fact-finding process because “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a 
lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’”92 Scalia underscores the need 
for the jury to view the witness’s behavior, as opposed to viewing the defendant’s 
behavior, during this fact-finding process.93 Indeed, since 1895, the Supreme Court 
has stressed the role of the jury to assess the witness—not the defendant—to 
determine the witness’s credibility.94 Scalia also found it essential to “undo the false 
accuser.”95 Face-to-face confrontation, however, is not an indispensable element of 
the Sixth Amendment; it is a preference.96 This preference may be outweighed by 
public policy considerations and the necessities of the case.97 Although this preference 
for physical, face-to-face confrontation may not be easily disregarded, important 
public policy considerations can trump this right as long as the reliability of testimony 
is otherwise assured.98 For instance, the need to admit hearsay statements made by 
an absent declarant can trump this preference.99  
                                                 
88  Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. 
89  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1985) 
(per curiam)) (“The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the 
right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.”); 
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (“A fact which can be primarily established only by 
witnesses cannot be proved against an accused . . . except by witnesses . . . upon whom he can look 
while being tried . . . .”). 
90  Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 748, 749–750 (1987) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).  
91  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
92  Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019.  
93  Id. (“The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the 
defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.”). 
94  Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional 
provision . . . [is] [to compel the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look 
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief.”). 
95  Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 (“That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or 
abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child 
coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.”). 
96  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)). 
97  Id. at 849–50 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).   
98  Id. at 850.  
99  Id. at 849. 
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When the defendant is not confronting witnesses, the Due Process Clause may 
still ensure the defendant’s right to be present at trial, but only to the extent that the 
defendant’s absence would impede a fair and just hearing.100 Additionally, federal 
statutes and state rules or constitutions may codify the defendant’s right to be 
present at trial.101 
Ultimately, these aforementioned rights belong to the defendant, rather than 
the State. Hence, the defendant may waive or forfeit his or her right to be physically 
present in the courtroom.102 Likewise, other rights under the Sixth Amendment, such 
as the right to confrontation, may be waived if performed intelligently and 
knowingly.103  
 
II. CURRENT SOLUTIONS TO BIAS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
 
Since the defendant’s mere physical presence might cause the judge or the jury 
to become biased, it is imperative that courts consider alternatives to the status quo 
to meet their obligation to impartiality. 
   
A. Court Solutions 
 
i. Bias in Judges 
 
Although courts define bias broadly, instances of concealed or implicit bias will 
virtually always fail to meet the burden for recusal. According to the U.S. Code, a 
judge must recuse himself or herself in the case of “a personal bias or prejudice” 
against any party to the proceeding.104 Judicial bias includes both the appearance of 
bias as well as specific instances of bias in fact, such as when a judge has a financial 
interest in the case.105 The Supreme Court explained that disqualification is triggered 
by personal bias from an “extrajudicial source” that results “in an opinion on the 
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the 
                                                 
100  United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 
(1934)); e.g., State v. Dann, 74 P.3d 231, 245 (Ariz. 2003) (stating the defendant’s right to be present 
does not extend to in-chambers pretrial conferences, brief bench conferences with attorneys, and 
“various other conferences characterized as relating only to the resolution of questions of law.”). 
101  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (“The defendant must be present at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial 
arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the 
verdict; and (3) sentencing.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1043 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.50 (2004); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.03 (2004).  
102  Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1973) (stating waiver occurs when a defendant voluntarily 
absents himself from the courtroom after proceedings have begun, but judicial warning is not required); 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (contrastingly, forfeiture occurs when a defendant’s conduct is 
“so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in 
the courtroom,” but the defendant must be warned by the court prior to his or her removal).  
103  See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1966). 
104  28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006). 
105  Id. at § 455.  
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case.”106 The Third Circuit developed a three-part test for judicial disqualification in 
which the movant carries the burden: “1. The facts must be material and stated with 
particularity; 2. The facts must be such that, if true they would convince a reasonable 
man that a bias exists; and 3. The facts must show the bias is personal, as opposed to 
judicial, in nature.”107 In practice, this is a very difficult burden to meet, except for 
obvious cases of familial or financial conflicts.108 
Judges must also adhere to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct (CJC), which sets their ethical standards.109 According to the 
CJC, a judge must “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the . . . impartiality of the judiciary, and [must] avoid impropriety and the appearance 
of impropriety.”110 The CJC’s preamble recognizes that a “fair and impartial judiciary 
is indispensable to our system of justice.”111 Accordingly, judges “should aspire at all 
times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their . . . 
impartiality.” 112  Ultimately, both rules mandate that a judge who, in fact, acts 
impartially still must be disqualified when the mere appearance of personal bias 
arises.  
 
ii. Bias in Jurors 
 
Due Process and the Sixth Amendment both independently require an 
impartial and indifferent jury.113 “The bias or prejudice of even a single juror would 
violate [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial.”114 Although impartiality is defined as 
“a state of mind,” there is no particular test or procedure to ascertain whether a juror 
is impartial.115 In the absence of a standardized test, trial judges are given wide 
latitude to determine whether a juror is impartial. 116  Courts may consider the 
                                                 
106  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 
31 (1921)).  
107  United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Berger, 255 U.S. at 31). 
108  See When Do Supreme Court Justices Recuse Themselves?, SLATE (Oct. 2, 2000, 5:54PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2000/10/when_do_supreme_court_justices_re
cuse_themselves.html. 
109  MODEL RULES OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.1, pmbl. (AM. BAR AAA’N 2010).  
110  Id. at r. 1.2. 
111  Id. at pmbl. 
112  Id.  
113  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965)). 
114  Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998). 
115  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724–25 (1961) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–46 
(1936)) (“Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this 
mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and 
procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”). 
116  See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We do not minimize the 
importance to criminal defendants of removing the possibility of racial bias on the jury. How best to do 
that, however, is primarily left to the broad discretion of the district court.”); DeVaughn v. State, 769 
S.E.2d 70, 74 (Ga. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 56, (2015) (“The trial court has broad discretion to 
determine a potential juror's impartiality and to strike for cause jurors who may not be fair and 
impartial.”); State v. Lucky, 96-1687 (La. 4/13/99); 755 So. 2d 845, 850 (“Not every predisposition or 
leaning in any direction rises to the level of substantial impairment. Significantly, it is in the 
determination of substantial impairment that the trial judge's broad discretion plays the critical role.”); 
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following factors when deciding juror impartiality: preconceived notions,117 opinions,118 
views,119 biases or prejudices,120 and prior knowledge or impressions.121 Ultimately, 
the defendant carries the burden of demonstrating a juror’s bias.122 
The courts recognize two types of biases held by jurors: actual bias and implied 
bias.123 Actual bias—the more common of the two—is “bias in fact,” or a state of mind 
that indicates the person will not act completely impartially.124 Examples include 
where a juror states he or she cannot be impartial, where a juror has a specific 
negative experience with one of the parties and equivocates on whether he or she can 
be impartial, and where a juror expressed doubts about being impartial in a case that 
involved an offense similar to the one the juror had been convicted of.125 Thus, actual 
bias is typically ascertained by evidence obtained on voir dire.126  
Alternatively, implied bias is “conclusively presumed as a matter of law.”127 
The issue is “whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy 
would be prejudiced.”128 Jurors found to harbor implied biases “must be recused even 
where the juror affirmatively asserts (or even believes) that he or she can and will be 
impartial.”129 Examples of implied bias include a juror who had a personal experience 
similar to the fact pattern in the current trial, a juror who knew of highly prejudicial 
information about the defendant, a juror whose children were convicted of using the 
drug involved in the current case, a juror who failed to disclose that her brother was 
murdered while on a murder case, and jurors deliberating on a robbery and murder 
case who coincidentally experienced a hotel room break-in.130 Consequently, findings 
                                                 
Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 760 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Mass. 2002) (“Whether to accept the declaration of 
a juror that he or she is disinterested lies within the broad discretion of the trial judge.”); Murff v. Pass, 
249 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2008) (“Because trial judges are present in the courtroom and are in the best 
position to evaluate the sincerity and attitude of individual panel members, they are given wide 
latitude in both conducting voir dire proceedings and in determining whether a panel member is 
impermissibly partial.”).  
117  State v. Iuli, 65 P.3d 143, 151 (Haw. 2003) (citing State v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1989)). 
118  United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A juror is considered to be impartial 
‘only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’”) 
(citations omitted).  
119  State v. White, 693 N.E.2d 772, 777 (Ohio 1998) (“[T]he court must determine whether the prospective 
juror's views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))). 
120  Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 257 (Fla. 2004) (“The test for determining juror competency is whether 
the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice.” (citing Lusk v. State 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984))).  
121  State v. Jaynes, 549 S.E.2d 179, 190 (N.C. 2001). 
122  See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S 145, 157 
(1878)). 
123  Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003). 
124  United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Torres, 128 
F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
125  Id.  
126  Id. at 1111–13. 
127  Id. at 1111 (citing 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 266 (1995)).  
128  Id. at 1112 (quoting United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1260—61 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
129  Id. at 1113. 
130  Id. at 1112–13.  
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of both actual and implied biases require a juror to be aware of, and to report, possible 
conflicts or require concrete evidence of conflicts.  
This is our sole safeguard against bias. Hence, the juror with concealed biases 
will continue to be selected for juries. The African-American judge who is more 
lenient with African-American defendants will continue to provide disparate 
sentences, just as the Caucasian judge who hands out disproportionately harsh 
sentences to African-American defendants will continue to provide those disparate 
sentences. These practices will continue because our system fails to detect and to 
address concealed and implicit biases. Because of this long felt, but unsolved, need to 
inhibit bias in the courtroom, scholars have proposed a multitude of suggestions for 
both judges and jurors. As we will see, however, these solutions merely offer a band-
aid solution.   
 
B. Academic Proposals 
  
i. Bias in Judges 
 
a. Training  
 
One proposal is testing and training sessions to mitigate bias amongst judges. 
This method is gaining traction as more than 250 federal immigration judges 
attended a mandatory anti-bias training session in August 2016.131  A paper co-
written by law professors at Cornell and Vanderbilt, along with a U.S. District Court 
judge, explains this approach and its limitations. 132  First, testing may be 
accomplished through the IAT.133 The testing results will not disqualify or have any 
other practical impact on judges, other than informing them of potential bias.134 
Second, they suggest providing training sessions on bias, without providing specifics 
on how to conduct such sessions. 135  The authors acknowledge the procedure’s 
limitations: “there is a risk of insufficient correction, unnecessary correction, or even 
overcorrection” that results in a distorted decision.136 
Other drawbacks to training exist. First, training sessions are not equipped to 
address the plethora of biases that may shift over time; positive or negative biases 
can derive from subjective ideas of beauty, danger, intelligence, culture, and religion, 
all of which go far beyond simplistic concepts of racial biases. Second, these training 
sessions are unlikely to overwrite a lifetime of mental associations that produce 
biases. It is unlikely that biases, which must first be identified, will be overwritten in 
two hours or two months. After all, judges appeared to retain the same biases for 
                                                 
131  Caitlin Dickerson, How U.S. Immigration Judges Battle Their Own Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/us/us-immigration-judges-
bias.html?emc=edit_ca_20161005&nl=california-today&nlid=70044346&te=1&_r=1. 
132  Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1226–27. 
133  Id. at 1198–99, 1227. 
134  Id. at 1227—28. 
135  See id. at 1228.  
136  Id. at 1229.  
 
2018]       Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom 
 
 
   
63 
wealth that children shared in independent studies. Third, the simulated sessions 
are unlikely to translate to lasting changes in practice. The concepts of ego depletion 
and cognitive load explain that efforts to maintain will or self-control are tiring: “if 
you have had to force yourself to do something, you are less willing or less able to 
exert self-control when the next challenge comes around.”137 Judge Dana Marks, an 
immigration judge, explained that massive caseloads frustrate the ability to 
methodically check one’s biases: “‘[W]ould I treat a young person the same way I’m 
treating this old person?’ she said. 'Would I treat a black person the same way I’m 
treating this white person? This situation of rush, rush, rush as fast as we can go, it’s 
not conducive to doing that.’”138 Fourth, these training sessions may produce a cobra 
effect due to a normalization of stereotypes; research shows that training sessions 
that increase awareness of stereotypes led participants to express more stereotypes 
than those who received no awareness training.139  
 
b. Exposure  
 
A second approach involves “stereotype-incongruent models” or exposure to 
counter-typical associations.140 This model posits that a person’s bias against a group 
will cease upon exposure to group members who lack that stereotypical feature.141 
This may be accomplished by “direct contact with countertypical people,” or “vicarious 
contact” through the use of “images, videos, simulations, or even imagination.”142 For 
example, posting a picture of Obama alongside judges who have a bias against black 
defendants theoretically mitigates the bias.143  
Yet, the debiasing effects of vicarious contact have already been proven to be 
minor.144 When a jurisdiction consisted of roughly half white judges and half black 
judges, white judges still showed a “strong set of implicit biases.”145 This model may 
also introduce a cobra effect by inversing a negative bias to a positive bias rather than 
neutralizing the bias altogether. Additionally, it seems suited for race at the expense 
of other abstract biases that may derive from political associations or concepts of 
beauty.  
 
 
 
c. Self-Improvement 
                                                 
137  KAHNEMAN, supra note 70, at 41–42. 
138  Dickerson, supra note 130.  
139  See Michelle M. Duguid & Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt, Condoning Stereotyping? How Awareness of 
Stereotyping Prevalence Impacts Expression of Stereotypes, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 343, 352 (2015). 
140  Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1226; Kang et al., supra note 9, at 1169 (“One potentially effective 
strategy is to expose ourselves to countertypical associations.”). 
141  Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1169.  
142  Id. at 1170–71. 
143  See Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1227. 
144  Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1172. 
145  Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1227. 
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A third approach seeks to break the causal effect of bias on a judge’s decision-
making, rather than eliminating the bias, through three steps: (1) by doubting one’s 
objectivity; (2) by increasing one’s motivation to be fair; and (3) by improving 
conditions of one’s decision making.146 The second step is accomplished by persuading 
judges that a genuine problem exists through self-study, while the third step 
encourages “judges to take special care when they must respond quickly” and 
encourages them to avoid elevated emotional states such as anger against certain 
social categories.147  
The self-improvement approach faces many of the same limitations already 
discussed. First, it is clear that people overrate their objectivity and likewise, may 
miscalculate how much skepticism is required. Also, judges already have motivation 
to be fair due to ethical and legal obligations. Self-study is commendable, but it is 
neither standardized nor measurable. It also imposes increasing time commitments 
for judges. Additionally, encouraging judges to slowly deliberate and to avoid certain 
emotions just fails to account for the practical realities of increasing docket loads and 
inherently emotional trials. 
 
d. Audits  
 
Fourth, scholars propose judges should undertake audits of their judicial 
decisions.148 For example, Kang suggests that judges adopt an accountability model, 
whereby judges record all of their rulings to help reveal biases through a history of 
data points.149 Kang argues such knowledge will create a negative feedback loop that 
will allow them to make corrective changes based on evidence of biased 
performance.150  
Kang, however, readily admits some limitations: judges may “lack both the 
quantitative training and the resources to track their own performance statistics.”151 
Beyond this, auditing fails to account for ego depletion due to overwhelming dockets. 
More importantly, the argument that knowledge of biased decisions creates a 
negative feedback loop runs counter to overwhelming evidence of how habits are 
formed.152 The cue for biased judgment is not obliviousness to the bias, the cue is the 
defendant. For example, an alcoholic knows drinking is harmful, but the sight of a 
beer bottle may trigger a habit loop just as the sight of a defendant may trigger 
implicit biases. This is a reactive remedy rather than a proactive solution, and an 
unproven one at that. 
                                                 
146  Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1172–77.  
147  Id. at 1174, 1177. 
148  Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1226, 1230; see Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1178. 
149  Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1178–79. 
150  Id.  
151  Id. at 1179. 
152  See CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY WE DO WHAT WE DO IN LIFE AND BUSINESS (2012) 
(Habits involve a “three-step loop”: (1) a cue “that tells your brain to go into automatic mode”; (2) a 
routine, “which can be physical or mental or emotional”; and (3) a reward.).   
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e. Procedural Changes  
 
Last, scholars recommend that judges alter courtroom practices. 153  Some 
examples include expanding “the use of three-judge courts” or increasing “appellate 
scrutiny” by “employing de novo review rather than clear error review.”154  
The author readily concedes that employing a three-judge panel may be too 
costly or too inefficient. 155  The author fails to account for another effect: biased 
appeals. Research suggests that black judges are consistently overturned more often 
than white judges, even when accounting for variables such as ideological 
differences.156 Substitution of one bias for another is no remedy. 
    
ii. Bias in Jurors 
 
Scholars offer distinct recommendations to reduce bias amongst jurors, except 
for the aforementioned suggestion of exposure to counter-typical associations.157 
 
a. Screening  
 
Individual screening is advocated as a method to screen out jurors with 
excessively high biases.158 Yet, questions abound: how much is too much? Which 
biases will be tested? Will this produce satellite litigation over unreliable IATs? 
  
b. Diversity 
 
Jury diversity may cancel out the biases of other jurors by way of increasing 
the pool of biases.159  
While juror diversity may be more effective in reaching a fair decision, this 
solution seeks to increase biases rather than mitigating or eliminating them. 
Accordingly, it is fraught with unforeseen consequences. For example, a juror pool 
with Asians, Caucasians, and Latinos may still hold the same implicit biases toward 
Native Americans. Likewise, increasing the pool of African-Americans may still 
result in a unanimous bias against African-Americans. Moreover, increasing 
diversity may simply trigger concealed bias. Besides, with a maximum of twelve 
jurors, it is unlikely to account for every bias that might occur at trial and it would 
be costly to mandate a representative of every group. 
                                                 
153  Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1231. 
154  Id. 
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157  See Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1169, 1179–86. 
158  Id. at 1179. 
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c. Instructions  
 
Scholars also propose jury instructions to mitigate implicit bias in jurors.160  
Kang concedes no empirical studies have tested the effectiveness of this model, but 
argues such instruction is “likely to do more good than harm.”161 In fact, a similar 
system has been tested and failed because of the cobra effect. After considerable 
research about flaws in eyewitness testimony emerged, New Jersey enacted a law 
requiring judges to give instructions whenever a case involved eyewitness 
testimony. 162  These jury instructions informed jurors of the current status of 
eyewitness research and gave them factors to decide whether such testimony was 
reliable.163 The jury instructions accomplished the complete opposite of the intended 
effect: in practice, jurors became skeptical of “all eyewitness testimony—even 
testimony that should be considered reasonably reliable.” 164  In this case, jury 
instructions about implicit bias may have similar unintended effects. Another study 
found that seemingly innocuous instructions regarding the presumption of innocence 
actually may trigger racial stereotypes. 165  Hence, incorporating more jury 
instructions may simply add confusion for jurors, or worse, trigger biases that might 
not occur otherwise.  
 
d. Category-conscious strategies 
  
Last, Kang recommends category-conscious strategies—which entail jurors 
explicitly discussing their biases amongst fellow jurors—and perspective shifting 
strategies, whereby jurors try empathizing with a party to the case or with other 
ethnicities by metaphorically stepping into their shoes.166  
This model requires jurors to be aware of all biases, which ignores the reality 
of implicit bias.167 Moreover, this model would further delay trial proceedings and 
risk jurors digressing into long conversations completely unrelated to the evidence. 
The goal for jurors is to weigh, and most importantly, remember the evidence. This 
solution risks undermining both of those tasks. Notably, this solution assumes jurors 
will reveal their concealed biases. According to the Bradley effect—a theory based on 
the failed political run by Tom Bradley, an African American who lost despite being 
                                                 
160  Id. at 1181–82. 
161  Id. at 1183–84. 
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ahead in the polls—concealed biases may be hidden even from strangers in order to 
appear politically correct.168  
 
iii. Virtual Avatars 
 
Adam Benforado, a law professor at Drexel University, offers an all-
encompassing, unique solution that deserves its own section: he suggests dispensing 
with live trials and replacing them with trials consisting of virtual avatars.169 Neutral 
avatars would replace every person in the court, including judges, attorneys, 
defendants, and jurors.170 The avatar system would also standardize everyone’s voice, 
presumably akin to voice disguisement, so that any identifiable accents are 
removed.171  Additionally, the virtual environment would be standardized so that 
courtroom colors, lighting, heights of physical objects, and any other variability of a 
physical courtroom is negated.172 Benforado also recommends broadcasting criminal 
trials to “supplement[] the spotty error- and bias-checking done by attorneys and 
judges with crowdsourced oversight.” 173  Benforado argues witness demeanor is 
irrelevant, asserting “traditional justifications—particularly that judges and jurors 
need to be able to take in a witness’s entire demeanor—just do not stack up against 
the science.”174 He claims, “In most trials, there is no compelling reason for jurors to 
inspect the defendant, witness, or attorney in the flesh.”175 He contends judges should 
“stop instructing [jurors] to focus on demeanor evidence . . . [or] simply . . . bar [jurors] 
from observing demeanor altogether.”176 Benforado also suggests the virtual system 
will help eliminate attorney and judicial bias towards jurors.177  
These methods of removing bias from the courtroom are unconstitutional, clash 
with scientific studies, and are impractical. Scalia mused, “[it] is difficult to imagine 
a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face 
encounter” than the placement of a screen between the criminal defendant and 
testifying witness.178 The constitutional violations of a physical screen in Coy pale in 
comparison to the constitutional violations of an avatar system. An avatar system 
would re-introduce “the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use 
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused,” which was the primary 
evil the Confrontation Clause sought to eradicate.179 Assuming avatars will take an 
oath and may be cross-examined, the avatars will nevertheless discard a central 
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element of the Confrontation Clause: “[O]bservation of demeanor by the trier of 
fact.”180 
Scalia championed face-to-face confrontation, noting it is harder “to lie ‘[to 
someone’s] face’ than ‘behind his [or her] back.’”181 Alternatively, Benforado suggests 
an avatar system and claims “there is no compelling reason for jurors to inspect the  
. . . witness . . .  in the flesh.”182 According to science, however, Scalia is closest to the 
truth.  
One study squarely addresses this question of whether it is easier to lie to 
someone’s face or easier to lie in a virtual environment.183 The study concluded that 
people are less likely to detect highly motivated liars’ deception in virtual 
environments than via face-to-face interactions.184 Although this study compared text 
messaging with face-to-face interactions, a text-messaging system is analogous to 
Benforado’s avatar system because the avatars would be devoid of expression, 
mannerisms, and vocal changes.185 The study reasoned that a digital environment 
facilitates deception because it removes “nonverbal and vocal behavior” that help 
viewers determine whether one is lying: behaviors include “facial characteristics like 
gaze aversion, smile duration, eye blinking or broken eye contact;” “bodily movements 
like self-manipulations, illustrators, and shifting (or rigid) body positions;” and other 
vocal properties.186  
In addition to the legal and scientific hurdles of such a proposal, Benforado’s 
virtual avatar system is impractical and raises more questions than answers. No 
logistics are mentioned, and without more, such a system cannot be implemented 
even if it did not run afoul of the Constitution.  
 
 
III. THE DOUBLE-BLIND SYSTEM  
 
A. Overview  
 
The Double-Blind System stops biases where our current system and other 
proposals fail to do so. It works by removing the defendant from view, thereby 
precluding any biases—whether concealed, implicit, or currently undefined—from 
occurring at the source. Its simplicity is its core function, allowing juries to focus on 
the evidence rather than falling susceptible to unavoidable biases. Moreover, this 
procedure can be accomplished using technology and procedures that already exist in 
the courtroom. In a single-blind system, the jury will no longer view or hear the 
                                                 
180  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 837 (1990). 
181  Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019. 
182  BENFORADO, supra note 168, at 266–67. 
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184  Id. at 7 (“Indeed, a comparison across the four conditions in the study reveals that the highly motivated 
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defendant in a criminal trial, except when the defendant testifies by right. In a 
double-blind system, both the jury and the judge will no longer view or hear the 
defendant, except when the defendant testifies.  
 
i. The Defendant 
 
The defendant may be housed in the jail conference room, in the attorney-client 
meeting room located adjacent to the courtroom, in the room normally reserved for 
child witness examinations, or another room approved by the judge. The defendant 
will be able to use any items that he normally would have access to, such as writing 
utensils and paper.  The defendant will have uninterrupted access to audio channels 
to communicate with defense counsel at all times. The defendant also will have a two-
way closed-circuit television (CCTV) that allows live face-to-face confrontation with 
all witnesses. The defendant's TV monitor can also include a picture-in-picture option 
to view courtroom demonstrations and the jury. The defendant’s name will be 
substituted with initials, as is done in cases involving minors, to prevent inferences 
based on the name. 
 
ii. The Witness  
 
The witness stand would be equipped with a two-way CCTV monitor that 
contains a clear view of the defendant. In child sexual assault cases, this monitor 
could be turned off pursuant to court discretion and case-specific findings: in these 
cases, the two-way CCTV would be switched to one-way CCTV, whereby the 
defendant can see and hear the witness but the witness would not see or hear the 
defendant. To be clear, this one-way use will be limited to a very narrow set of cases 
that are already allowed under precedent, including Coy and Craig.187 Otherwise, the 
monitor will always present a face-to-face view of the defendant, just as the 
defendant’s monitor will show a clear view of the witness during live testimony. The 
witness will be unable to hear the defendant. All in-court identifications of the 
defendant will be made by the witness through a closed-circuit television or in court 
outside of the jury’s presence. 
 
iii. The Jury 
 
The jury will be unable to see or hear the defendant at all times. Importantly, 
the jury will always view witnesses as they have for hundreds of years: via the 
witness stand. Even in cases of child sexual assault, the jury will always view the 
child witness as the witness testifies from the witness stand. This is a major 
improvement on the current system, which allows children who are overcome by fear 
of the defendant to testify outside the presence of the jury.188  
 
                                                 
187  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).  
188  See, e.g., Maryland, 497 U.S. at 853. 
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iv. The Judge  
 
Under a double-blind setup, the judge will be unable to see or hear the 
defendant, akin to the jury in a single-blind setup. In a single-blind setup, the judge’s 
role remains unchanged.   
 
B. The Constitutionality of the Double-Blind System 
 
The Sixth Amendment reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed . . . [and the right] to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him . . . .”189 
In order to understand the policies behind the Double-Blind System, it is 
critical to understand how three cases established the bedrock of face-to-face 
constitutional analysis. 
 
i. Witness Screens 
 
In Coy, Iowa enacted a statute that authorized the placement of a screen 
between the defendant and alleged underage victims of sexual assault who testified 
against that defendant.190 The screen made it impossible for the testifying victims to 
see the defendant during trial, but the defendant was able to see the witnesses dimly 
through the screen.191 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the screen violated 
appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation because the screen 
blocked the witness’s view of the defendant. 192  Yet, without addressing specific 
exceptions, the Court acknowledged the “rights conferred by the Confrontation 
Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other important interests.”193 The Court 
clarified that any potential exception must “further an important public policy.”194 
Although the Court did not address the possibility of using closed-circuit television, 
O’Connor suggested that such technology “may raise no substantial Confrontation 
Clause problem since they involve testimony in the presence of the defendant.”195 
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ii. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)  
 
Two years later, the Supreme Court identified a specific exception to the right 
of face-to-face confrontation: cases involving sexual abuse of minors.196 In Craig, the 
State accused the defendant of sexually abusing a six-year-old child.197 Fearing the 
child would suffer serious emotional distress upon seeing the defendant in court, the 
State invoked a statutory procedure that allowed testimony via one-way closed-circuit 
television that prevented the witness from seeing the defendant but still allowed the 
defendant to view the witness.198 The Court ruled the procedure to be constitutional, 
explaining, “‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial,’ a preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations 
of public policy and the necessities of the case.’”199 The Court underscored that the 
preference is not easily dispensed with.200 Rather, “a defendant’s right to confront 
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at 
trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important 
public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”201 
The Court clarified, “the presence of . . . other elements of confrontation—oath, cross-
examination, and observation of the witness' demeanor—adequately ensures that the 
testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner 
functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.”202  
In Craig, the Court held the “State’s interest in the physical and psychological 
well-being of child abuse victims” constitutes an important state interest, as long as 
the State makes “an adequate showing of necessity,” which must be a case-specific 
inquiry.203 In cases of child abuse victims, necessity is shown when the defendant, 
rather than the courtroom, traumatizes the child witness.204  
In 2004, the Court’s test for the admissibility of out-of-court statements 
changed from one based on “reliability” to whether the statements were “testimonial” 
in Crawford v. Washington.205 Crawford held the Confrontation Clause bars out-of-
court statements that are testimonial, unless witnesses are unavailable and 
defendants had prior opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, regardless of whether 
such statements are deemed reliable. 206 Some may question whether Craig’s 
interpretation survives the analysis provided by Crawford, which rejects the idea that 
the Confrontation Clause generally protects evidentiary reliability. 207  It is an 
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important question for cases similar to Craig because the minors testified out of court, 
without face-to-face confrontation. In Crawford, Scalia explained the Confrontation 
Clause ensures reliability of evidence procedurally through cross-examination, rather 
than ensuring the reliability of evidence substantively. 208  In other words, the 
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee evidence is reliable; it only guarantees 
evidence is scrutinized, which normally should result in reliable evidence. 209 
Ultimately, courts and commentators agree Crawford did not overrule Craig.210 
Under the Double-Blind System, this question is irrelevant, since witnesses always 
testify in court, unlike what occurs under Craig exceptions. Hence, a Crawford 
analysis is never triggered.  
 
iii. Current Law  
 
Maryland v. Craig still governs the use of testimony via CCTV where the 
defendant is denied a physical face-to-face confrontation. This legal standard applies 
to both formats of the Double-Blind System, which incorporates a two-way, closed-
circuit television except in the rare situations that call for one-way testimony under 
Craig. As mentioned, one-way CCTV is only permissible when: (1) denial of physical, 
face-to-face confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy, and (2) 
the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. 211  Under the Double-Blind 
System, the latter is assured because the witness always testifies in court, and a 
virtual face-to-face encounter creates no material differences from its physical 
counterpart. Thus, the last step for determining whether the Double-Blind System is 
constitutional depends on whether or not it furthers an important public policy. Until 
courts endorse the Double-Blind System as a bright-line rule, this finding must be 
case-specific, and the following public policies may enable the Double-Blind System 
to be employed today.  
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C. The Double-Blind System Furthers Numerous Public Policies and 
Compelling State Interests 
 
i. The Double-Blind System Furthers Jury Impartiality and 
Legitimacy 
 
“Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free 
from outside influences.”212 Due process necessitates a jury that is both “capable and 
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”213 Most importantly, the 
Sixth Amendment mandates that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed.”214 As previously demonstrated, jurors are often incapable 
of mechanically ignoring biases—whether explicit, concealed, or implicit—toward a 
defendant. According to the Constitution and the Due Process Clause, the interest in 
securing jury impartiality alone should enable the Double-Blind System.  
Considering the demographics of America, an all-white jury pool may be both 
common and cause for alarm. This is not a new concern. Ironically, our Founders also 
feared an all-white jury when Britain attempted to outsource juries for crimes that 
occurred in the colonies during the late eighteenth century.215  A study by Duke 
University found that “all-white jury pools in Florida convicted black defendants 16 
percent more often than white defendants, a gap that was nearly eliminated when at 
least one member of the jury pool was black.”216 This disparity may exacerbate public 
sentiment towards highly-charged cases, such as police killings. However, increased 
confidence in unbiased and principled procedures may increase the public’s 
acceptance of verdicts, regardless of the preferred outcome.217 
The Double-Blind System reduces the appearance of partiality and potential 
biases that result from a homogenous jury by eliminating the jury’s view of the 
defendant. As one columnist said, “all-white juries risk undermining the perception 
of justice in minority communities, even if a mixed-race jury would have reached the 
same verdict or imposed the same sentence.”218 
Of course, all-white juries are not offensive in themselves. Rather, it’s the 
perception that tribalism may render a biased verdict against the defendant, who is 
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a cultural outsider. This concern is rooted in the same fears our Founders held. Thus, 
a court’s legitimacy will be improved because one causal connection between a biased 
jury and a biased verdict will be severed.  
 
ii. The Double-Blind System Ensures the Reliability of Evidence 
 
The four procedural elements that ensure the reliability of evidence, pursuant 
to the Confrontation Clause, include (1) the witness’s physical presence; (2) witness 
statements given under oath, which signals the seriousness of the matter and guards 
against lying due to the consequences of perjury; (3) cross-examination; and (4) 
observation of the witness’s demeanor by the trier of fact.219 Under the Double-Blind 
System, the witness always testifies in court. Thus significant gains are made in 
sexual abuse trials involving minors, who often testify outside of the jury’s presence.  
In one case involving a minor, the court had no control over the examination 
process, the camera failed to show a complete view of the witness, and the examiner 
and an unauthorized individual conducted part of the child’s examination.220 None of 
those circumstances, which impermissibly ran afoul of the Confrontation Clause’s 
procedural elements, would occur under the Double-Blind System. Obviously, an 
incomplete view of the witness undermines the jury’s primary objective under the 
Confrontation Clause: the ability “to stand face to face with the [witness] in order 
that [the jury] may look at [the witness], and judge by [the witness’s] demeanor upon 
the stand and the manner in which [the witness] gives [the witness’s] testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief.”221 The proposed solution, rather than undermining 
that objective, ensures it by always placing the witness in the witness stand.  
Second, the mere separation of the child witness from the courtroom, for 
example, through videotaped depositions, may create biases against the defendant. 
One study found that jurors who viewed videotaped depositions of underage victims 
of sexual assaults were more certain of a defendant’s guilt than jurors who viewed 
similar testimony in court.222 The study also concluded that jurors may speculate 
about the defendant’s harmful effect on a child when both are physically present in 
the same room, thereby opening the door for undue considerations.223 These results 
suggest that defendants may be prejudiced by excluding child witnesses on an ad hoc 
basis. The Double-Blind System, however, would eliminate such prejudice by 
normalizing the absence of the defendant. As a result, there will be no speculation as 
to why the defendant and the witness are not in the same room. More importantly, 
there will be no presumption that the separation of the defendant from the witness 
is due to the court’s determination that the defendant may pose a danger to the 
witness. 
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iii. The Double-Blind System Increases Efficiency and Maintains 
Juror Secrecy 
  
Since the connection between demographic profiles of the jury will be severed 
from the demographic profile of the defendant, the Double-Blind System may result 
in a significant reduction of Batson hearings. Relatedly, the amount of appeals that 
pertain to biases held by judges or jurors may drop precipitously. For instance, the 
case involving the biased juror who presumed the defendant was guilty precisely 
because the defendant is Mexican is unlikely to be replicated under this system, let 
alone make its way to the Supreme Court. Future appeals may raise issues of bias 
towards witnesses, victims of crimes, or attorneys. Yet, the majority of cases likely 
involve prejudice directed towards the defendant. Consequently, court costs should 
decline along with docket loads that pertain to bias. Similarly, the Double-Blind 
System would avert future inquiries into piercing secret deliberations by jurors due 
to allegations of bias. 
   
iv. The Double-Blind System Reduces Suggestibility and Eyewitness 
Misidentification 
 
The Supreme Court noted, “[I]t is in the prosecution’s interest as well as the 
accused’s that witnesses’ identifications remain untainted,” so all parties agree 
suggestibility should be reduced. 224  The Double-Blind System shares the same 
underlying flaws of suggestibility as current in-court identification procedures, but it 
improves upon the flaws of suggestibility in several regards.  
Any witness—especially those who have seen trials on television—can 
determine who the defendant is in a trial.225 In most cases, no objection is made, 
despite this suggestibility, when a witness is asked to identify the defendant.226 
Objections that argue a defendant’s presence at defense counsel’s table is 
impermissibly suggestive are routinely dismissed. 227  The Second Circuit noted, 
“[T]here is always the question how far in-court identification is affected by the 
witness’ observing the defendant at the counsel table.” 228  Indeed, this in-court 
identification seems “perfunctory.”229 Courts are concerned with the current model of 
in-court identification and suggest that steps should be taken to ensure the process 
is fair by avoiding a procedure that amounts to a show-up.230 Although a trial court 
may not necessarily grant this request, the Supreme Court proposes that one method 
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of reducing in-court identification suggestibility may be accomplished by seating the 
defendant with other members of the trial audience.231 Many cases will exist where 
the audience in a courtroom is non-existent or does not resemble the defendant in any 
fashion. For example, the defendant may be the only black person in the courtroom.232 
In these situations, the Supreme Court’s recommendation is impractical. Moreover, 
placing a defendant, especially in extremely violent cases, with the audience poses a 
threat to the public and the courtroom generally. The defendant also poses a flight 
risk by remaining closer to the exit.  
The Double-Blind System, although subject to the flaw of suggestibility, 
improves upon the current method in the following ways: (1) It eliminates 
suggestibility by the defendant’s mere propinquity to defense counsel, (2) it adds the 
possibility of including other defendants in the picture during identification, and (3) 
it allows the witness to view the defendant close-up or at distances representative of 
the original encounter.  
There is no added suggestibility by employing the Double-Blind System, yet 
many possibilities exist to sharply reduce suggestibility. Although it is unlikely for 
the bailiff to bring a string of defendants into the courtroom who superficially 
resemble the defendant, it may be more easily accomplished in a room separate from 
the public and judge. Defendants normally are not shackled because of the prejudicial 
effect upon the jury and its effect on the decorum and dignity of judicial 
proceedings.233  If the defendant is not present in the courtroom, that concern is 
irrelevant, so multiple shackled defendants may be momentarily placed in a room at 
the same time without jeopardizing public safety. Thus, the eyewitness’s ability to 
distinguish the defendant from other inmates at the time of trial will forward the 
State’s and defense counsel’s interests in ensuring the eyewitness identification is 
accurate. After all, eyewitness misidentification is “the greatest contributing factor 
to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing, playing a role in more than 70 percent 
of convictions overturned through DNA testing nationwide.” 234  Additionally, if a 
defendant remains in a separate, guarded room, the flight and safety risks are 
virtually eliminated. 
The distance at which an eyewitness sees a person can affect the reliability of 
the identification.235 Specifically, distance is proportional to the amount of detail one 
can perceive about a person, such as the person’s face.236 Hence, the further away 
someone is, the blurrier that person will appear.237  Although this fact might be 
obvious, the courtroom identification procedure does not take this into account. The 
witness stand sits at a considerable distance from the defense table, thereby 
                                                 
231  Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 230 n.5 (1977). 
232  See, e.g., United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir. 1983), modified, 756 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 
1984).  
233  llinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). 
234  Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/eyewitness-
misidentification/ (last visited Mar 5, 2017). 
235  Thomas A. Busey & Geoffrey R. Loftus, Cognitive Science and the Law, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 111, 
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automatically blurring the defendant’s features. Consider myopia—also known as 
nearsightedness—a condition that causes distant objects to appear abnormally blurry 
though close objects appear normal. A witness who is robbed at gunpoint and suffers 
from myopia may clearly identify the defendant in a photo array but may hesitate to 
identify the same person while on the witness stand due to her vision. Although the 
State may argue that more weight should be placed on the defendant’s identification 
the night of the robbery, the jury may conclude that the witness’s memory is faulty 
rather than her vision. Of course, the witness will look right at the defense counsel’s 
table but may nevertheless falter because of the blurriness of the defendant. This 
causes needless and possibly erroneous speculation on the part of the jury, which can 
be exploited by either party. Alternatively, this new model can correct for this. The 
distance from the defendant on the night of the incident can be replicated with the 
camera. While hardly any court would have the eyewitness stand at arm’s length 
from the defendant during trial to make a positive identification, the Double-Blind 
System could implement this method in every trial. 
  
v. The Double-Blind System Increases Safety  
 
The Double-Blind System will also prevent violence that occurs in courthouses 
by eliminating the defendant’s presence. Violence that occurs in a courthouse is often 
committed by or against a defendant. In July 2016, a handcuffed inmate seized a gun 
from a sheriff and killed two bailiffs in a Michigan courthouse.238 In September 2016, 
a defendant appeared to pull a weapon out of his sleeve and lunged towards a 
prosecutor during trial.239 In 2011, a defendant punched a district attorney to the 
ground during a sentencing hearing in Oklahoma.240  Defendants have also been 
victims. In April 2014, a U.S. marshal shot and killed a defendant after the defendant 
aggressively rushed towards a witness with a pen.241 In June 2016, a father of a slain 
18-year-old woman attacked a smirking defendant during trial.242 In 2015, a father 
punched a defendant being sentenced for the murder of his three-year-old daughter 
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in Detroit.243 These incidents highlight findings by the National Center for State 
Courts that violent acts in courthouses are steadily increasing, despite increased 
security.244  
The Double-Blind System will increase the safety of courtroom personnel, the 
public, and the defendant because all of the aforementioned incidents would be 
impossible. The defendant will be kept in a separate room that bailiffs will oversee. 
Thus, the defendant is unable to physically interact with other court personnel, and, 
likewise, the public will be unable to interact with the defendant. Since this model 
incorporates two-way CCTV, victims may still address defendants during appropriate 
phases of trial, but neither party will physically interact.  
 
D. Criticisms of the Double-Blind System 
 
i. Virtual Confrontation is Unequal 
 
Critics may argue a virtual face-to-face encounter is not tantamount to its 
physical, face-to-face counterpart, and thus is not a constitutional equivalent. The 
Eighth Circuit stated that two-way CCTV is not constitutionally equivalent to 
physical, face-to-face confrontation because a virtual confrontation does not “provide 
the same truth-inducing effect.”245 But its only evidence to the contrary—that virtual 
confrontations do not induce the same truth-inducing effect as physical 
confrontations—spanned merely one sentence: “Given the ubiquity of television, even 
children are keenly aware that a television image of a person (including a defendant 
in the case of a two-way system) is not the person—something is lost in the 
translation.” 246  Other courts offer conclusory statements, citing opinions in a 
seemingly circular fashion, for this same proposition. 247  The Eighth Circuit 
hypothesized that intangible elements may be lost in a virtual medium.248 As a result, 
the court concluded, “[A] defendant watching a witness through a monitor will not 
have the same truth-inducing effect as an unmediated gaze across the courtroom.”249 
Before dissecting this concept, it is important to note that the Supreme Court 
rejects this notion that the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause is 
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impermissibly voided when employing virtual confrontation, even when the witness 
is completely unable to see the defendant.250 In fact, the Court explained that both 
the truth-seeking functions and symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause are 
preserved with closed-circuit television if all other elements of the Confrontation 
Clause exist: (1) The witness competently testifies under oath; (2) “The defendant 
retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and (3) The judge, 
jury, and defendant are able to view . . . the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he 
or she testifies.251  
Since the “truth-inducing effect” is the sole premise that the court proffers for 
the need of a physical, face-to-face, unmediated gaze by the witness upon the 
defendant, the key question is does the data support the unsubstantiated dogma?  
A study from Cornell University compared four mediums—telephone, face-to-
face, instant messaging, and email—and found three interdependent factors that 
affect one’s likelihood to deceive someone: (1) the degree to which messages are 
exchanged instantaneously and in real-time, (2) the degree to which the interaction 
is automatically documented, and (3) whether or not the speaker and listener share 
the same physical space.252 Here, the only difference between the physical and the 
virtual face-to-face encounter is the third factor. The third factor is relevant only 
towards “topics or issues that are contradicted by the physical setting (e.g., ‘I’m 
working on the case report’ when in fact the speaker is surfing news on the web).”253 
A witness’s testimony cannot be contradicted by the physical setting of the witness 
stand. Consequently, there is no difference in regard to a truth-inducing effect 
between a physical face-to-face conversation and a virtual face-to-face conversation. 
Moreover, even when the lack of shared space creates an opportunity to lie about 
physical setting, the study provides a clear remedy: “videoconferencing.”254 In sum, 
there is a nugatory difference in one’s ability to deceive when changing from a 
physical, face-to-face interaction to a virtual, face-to-face interaction.   
A study by the University of Michigan supports this notion that virtual face-
to-face meetings are tantamount to physical face-to-face meetings for the purposes of 
a truth-inducing effect. The research team studied 121 truthful and deceptive video 
clips from real court trials, including those involving Jodi Arias and Donna Scrivo, 
along with testimonies obtained from the Innocence Project website.255 The study 
developed an algorithm that correctly identified lying with a 60–75 percent success 
rate, which outperformed humans who “perform slightly above the chance level.”256  
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The following behaviors were more often associated with lying: (1) grimacing of the 
whole face, (2) looking directly at the questioner, (3) gesturing with both hands, (4) 
speaking with more vocal fill such as “um,” (5) distancing themselves from the action 
with words such as “he” or “she” rather than “I” or “we,” and (6) using phrases that 
reflected certainty.257 Remember, it is not the defendant who weighs the credibility 
of the witness, rather that is the factfinder’s function. If the witness has a virtual 
face-to-face meeting with the defendant—while sitting in the witness stand as is 
required by the Double-Blind System—then the jury is able to observe all of those 
behaviors that indicate when one is lying. Ultimately, the witness, the defendant, and 
the jury retain all capacities to weigh behaviors that indicate deception under the 
Double-Blind System. 
One question remains: Assuming arguendo that the truth-telling effect is 
triggered by a physical face-to-face interaction, is it also triggered by a virtual face-
to-face interaction? There is no research on point for such a precise question, but we 
can analogize from the medical context, which compares physical face-to-face therapy 
with virtual face-to-face therapy. According to a systematic review in 2010 that 
compared videoconferencing with physical, face-to-face sessions, “[T]here is a strong 
hypothesis that videoconference-based treatment produces the same results as face-
to-face therapy . . . .”258 A study that compared videoconferencing with face-to-face 
mental health sessions for American veterans found identical assessments of soft 
variables such as rapport and empathy.259 Another study found virtually equivalent 
clinical outcomes and measures for process variables such as satisfaction between 
patients who used virtual meetings or physical face-to-face meetings.260 Even Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (“Blue Cross”)—an insurance company that 
consistently resisted covering video telehealth services due to concerns of 
effectiveness—began covering virtual face-to-face visits as of December 2015. 261 
Ultimately, the mounting research convinced Blue Cross that virtual health visits 
were “indistinguishable from a [physical] face-to-face visit.”262  This realization is 
aligned with the industry standard that offers “almost universal” coverage of live 
video telehealth services by entities such as Aetna, Anthem, and UnitedHealthcare.263 
Consequently, if insurance companies and studies overwhelmingly agree that virtual 
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face-to-face visits are tantamount to physical face-to-face visits in virtually every 
aspect, then it is hard to imagine that any meaningful intangible elements that 
concerned the Eighth Circuit are lost in translation.  
Finally, one court provided another distinct rationale for why virtual face-to-
face confrontation is not constitutionally equivalent to its physical counterpart:  
 
“Even the most cutting-edge technology cannot wholly replace the 
weight of in-court testimony, for the electronic delivery of that 
testimony—no matter how clearly depicted and crisply heard—is 
isolated from the solemn atmosphere of the courtroom and compromises 
human connection to emotions like fear, apprehension, or confusion.”264  
 
Importantly, the Double-Blind System never substitutes in-court testimony. 
Accordingly, this concern is a moot point because the witness, regardless of age or 
crime, will always testify in court. 
 
ii. Defendant’s Right to Assist in Trial is Diminished 
 
A criminal defendant has “a due process right ‘to be present in his own person 
whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge.’”265 This right is not absolute and is not 
guaranteed “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.”266 Thus, 
the defendant is allowed to be present only “to the extent that a fair and just hearing 
would be thwarted by his absence.”267  
The benefits of a defendant’s in-court physical presence may protect individual 
and institutional interests. At an individual level, the right may ensure the 
defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel, to participate in trial strategy, to 
assist in presenting a defense, and to aid with cross-examination.268 One rarely cited 
concern also includes the ability to “influence the jury psychologically by [the] 
defendant’s presence.”269 At the institutional level, the defendant’s presence may 
ensure public confidence in the courts by establishing the appearance of fairness in 
the execution of justice.270 
In the Double-Blind System, the defendant retains the absolute ability to 
communicate with counsel, to participate in trial strategy, and to aid with cross-
examination because the defendant will hear and see the evidence, albeit through a 
monitor. Moreover, the defendant will have constant communication with defense 
counsel through a telephone or an earpiece setup. In a sense, this setup occurs in 
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professional leagues such as the National Football League every day, and many 
coaches swear by it: many play callers prefer strategizing from an upstairs booth to 
being on the sideline because it provides a more complete view.271  In court, the 
defendant may be freed from worrying about showing emotions, or lack thereof, that 
may be misinterpreted by a jury. Likewise, a psychological influence on the jury may 
not benefit the defendant and certainly has no basis in law: jurors have a “duty to 
base [their] verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy” and 
reaching a verdict based on psychological influences from a defendant contradicts the 
oath that every juror takes.272 Institutionally, the appearance of justice is furthered 
because jurors will observe the precautions taken to ensure bias is removed from the 
judicial system. Moreover, jurors will be aware the defendant is present, although 
virtually.   
Courts acknowledge that the right to be present may be accomplished 
virtually, in addition to physically.273 One might argue those cases arise when the 
defendant forfeits his or her Sixth Amendment rights due to disruptive behavior and, 
therefore, are not analogous to this system. Yet, courts are not required to employ 
virtual arrangements for those defendants. 274  Hence, it is notable that courts 
acknowledge that a defendant’s presence is preserved by employing digital 
arrangements such as CCTV. Courts focus on the following arrangements, which are 
guaranteed in the Double-Blind System, as indicators that no violation of the Sixth 
Amendment or abuse of discretion has occurred: the ability of the defendant to view 
and hear proceedings via closed circuit television and the ability to communicate with 
counsel.275 Thus, courts have considered situations similar to what the Double-Blind 
System proposes and found no material curtailment of the defendant’s right to assist 
in his or her own trial. 
 
E. The Double-Blind System’s Limitations 
 
i. A Defendant Has the Right to Testify  
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This is a feature, rather than a flaw of the system. One prosecutor explained, 
“I never had a case where taking the stand worked for the defendant.” 276  This 
sentiment is reflected by the fact that defendants rarely choose to take the stand. 
Nevertheless, defendants always have a right to testify in criminal trials.277 Jurors 
are normally instructed that “they should not hold the decision not to testify against 
a defendant,” but some undoubtedly may speculate why a defendant sits in a court 
silently as countless accusers come before him or her.278 Under this system, this 
speculation may be significantly reduced because the absence of the defendant will 
become normalized. This enhances the tactical choice to bring a defendant on the 
stand since, up to that point, the jurors are unable to hold prejudice against the 
defendant. Under the Double-Blind System, if the defendant does choose to testify, 
he or she would testify just as he or she would today.  
 
a. Homogenous Juries and Groupthink  
 
Juries, like all groups, are susceptible to a basic principle: “If the observers 
share a bias, the aggregation of judgments will not reduce it.” 279  Accordingly, a 
homogenous pool may be biased against a defendant due to biases including 
overconfidence and groupthink. The Framers, albeit in different words, likely 
understood this concept. In 1774, British parliament feared British soldiers accused 
of killing American colonists might face biased juries when tried by Americans, so the 
Administration of Justice Act (AJA) mandated that all British soldiers were to be 
tried exclusively in England.280 The Declaration of Independence criticized this action 
as one of the “Intolerable Acts.”281 In response, our Framers wrote the eternal words: 
“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”282 The Supreme Court 
later elaborated, “[S]election of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the 
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”283 
The purpose of this selection is threefold: 
  
(1) [to guard] “against the exercise of arbitrary power” and [ensure] that 
the “commonsense judgment of the community” will act as “a hedge 
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor, ” (2) [to preserve] 
“public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,” and (3) 
[to implement] our belief that “sharing in the administration of justice 
is a phase of civic responsibility.”284  
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To avoid delving too deeply into a separate constitutional discussion involving 
the Sixth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and a string of recent decisions—
namely Batson v. Kentucky—this Paper simply argues that the current practice of 
jury selection clashes with the purpose and history of American jury selection. The 
use of peremptory challenges has led to a perverse system foreshadowed by Justice 
Marshall: “Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a 
juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons . . . [i]f such 
easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor’s obligation 
to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court  
. . . may be illusory.” 285  Marshall argued that peremptory challenges should be 
eliminated because they may be rooted in a prosecutor’s “own conscious or 
unconscious racism” that may be mirrored by the judge, who accepts the explanation 
due to the judge’s own “conscious or unconscious racism.” 286  Marshall noted, an 
“instruction book used by the prosecutor’s office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly 
advised prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate ‘any member 
of a minority group.’”287 Another treatise for prosecutors read, “Do not take Jews, 
Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how 
rich or how well educated.”288  
The consequences on jury diversity are far-ranging. Dahlia Lithwick laments, 
“Study after study reflects the fact that black jurors are struck far more frequently 
than white ones.”289 Historical evidence indicates the persistence of this issue. From 
1983–1984, the “chance of a qualified black sitting on a jury was 1 in 10, compared to 
1 in 2 for a white” juror in Dallas County.290 
It may be more appropriate to restate Marshall’s concern of unconscious racism 
as the idea of implicit biases today. Yet, this Paper offers an alternative to Marshall’s 
proposal to eliminate peremptory challenges. First, we should keep peremptory 
challenges. Second, we should mandate a heterogeneous pool at the petit jury stage, 
rather than only requiring it at the venire stage. Currently, petit juries actually 
chosen are not required to “mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive 
groups in the population,” even though they “must be drawn from a source fairly 
representative of the community.” 291  The jury petit need not mirror the precise 
demographics of the county. Indeed it is impossible to have twelve jurors perfectly 
reflect the ethnic diversity of a region. Yet, the jury pool should never contain one 
hundred percent of one ethnicity, just as it should never contain exclusively males at 
the expense of females. As mentioned earlier, a study by Duke University found 
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significant disparities in conviction rates by all-white juries were practically 
eliminated when just one member of the out group deliberated with the majority.292 
If peremptory challenges struck all minorities, then we should simply draw from 
another venire pool until minimum diversity is met. In a decision that decided the 
merits of reducing the minimum number of jurors from twelve to six, the court 
explained, “[T]he number [of jurors] should probably be large enough to promote 
group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair 
possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.”293 “The 
Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section on the venire is a means of 
assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an 
impartial one (which it does).”294 If we fail to ensure juror diversity, we may be 
outsourcing our trials to pockets of communities, rather than including a cross-
section, in contravention of the underlying policies our Founders sought to cement 
into our Constitution. 
   
b. Eyewitness Bias and Scalia’s “False Accuser” 
 
Although the judge and jury may not see the defendant, certain eyewitnesses 
must inevitably view and identify the suspect at trial. The Double-Blind System, 
however, is not intended to correct for eyewitness biases. As an aside, consider the 
following true story in the context of Scalia’s notion of the “false accuser.”  
A lost, drunk passerby asking for directions, within moments, morphed into 
Toni Gustus’s rapist.295  She immediately memorialized his features: white, early 
twenties, a little black cross on one arm, dark blond hair that was parted in the 
middle, long nose, blue and narrow eyes, and a tapered jaw.296 After identifying the 
suspect through police lineups and gaining composure through church, she was ready 
to testify at trial.297 She saw her assailant for at least an hour in broad daylight, noted 
his key features, and conveyed to the jury she was one hundred percent sure the 
defendant present at trial raped her.298 There was only one problem: fourteen years 
later, the previously untested rape kit definitively exonerated the incarcerated 
defendant, who in fact had been falsely accused by Toni Gustus.299  
“Toni Gustus made a mistake, but it was not an error based in malice or hatred. 
It was an unintentional error of the mind. Her testimony and her confidence that she 
had identified the right person were truly powerful” for the jury. 300  Only after 
agreeing to speak with the falsely accused defendant years later did she realize her 
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mistake: by focusing on providing distinctive routine details to the police, she failed 
to notice the defendant’s crooked teeth, which could not have been those of her 
attacker who had straight teeth. 301  “The one physical feature that could have 
distinguished the rapist from [the defendant]—his teeth—was discarded not because 
it was hidden from view but because it was too ordinary to mention.” 302  Here, 
cognitive biases such as confirmation bias or focusing effects, along with the effect of 
mood states on memory and judgment, directly contributed to the defendant’s false 
imprisonment.303 
Scalia’s reliance on face-to-face confrontations derived, in part, from his belief 
that it is “always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind 
his back.’”304 Scalia believed the fact-finder’s ability to observe jurors, who make 
determinations based on weighing credibility of a witness, ensured the integrity of 
the fact-finding process.305 Scalia acknowledged the emotional costs of such face-to-
face interactions on victims, but emphasized the procedure may “undo the false 
accuser.”306 Yet, Scalia failed to account for the unwitting false accuser vis-à-vis the 
“false accuser,” by propounding individuals as fully capable of separating truth from 
misperceptions. These situations are eerily insidious because, as Toni Gustus’s case 
showed, “[e]veryone was wrong, but no one felt anything was wrong.” 307  By 
overlooking unconscious biases and their effect on memory and judgment, Scalia may 
have enabled the unwitting false accuser who confidently accuses a guilty mirage 
while staring face-to-face with an innocent defendant: a performance that any jury 
will be swayed by. As of 2013, conclusive DNA tests exonerated 250 prisoners: nearly 
seventy-five percent of those cases were decided on mistaken eyewitness accounts.308 
We must rethink age-old reasoning in light of the scientific evidence on bias. Scalia’s 
procedure is futile against an unwitting “false accuser,” whose harm on the fact-
finding process is tantamount to the false accuser who knowingly tells a lie to 
incarcerate the innocent. 
  
c. Characteristics that Are Necessary for Charges or Defenses 
May Be Revealed.  
 
In a few situations, the defendant may not remain completely anonymous due 
to the charges or defenses raised. Such charges may include hate crimes or other 
discriminatory charges, including age or racial discrimination. Cultural 
characteristics of the defendant may be relevant for some courts in even rarer cases 
when determining the reasonable person standard, the defendant’s mens rea, or 
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relevant degrees of homicide.309 Defense counsel may attack the credibility of the 
witness by identifying flaws in cross-racial eyewitness identification as well. In these 
cases, the defendant will remain invisible, but the parties may stipulate that the 
defendant falls into a certain class, or alternatively, is not of the same class as the 
victim. 
 
d. Indirect Indicators of Class May be Revealed 
 
Jurors or judges may form conjectures about a defendant’s characteristics—
whether consciously or subconsciously, correctly or incorrectly—through 
circumstantial evidence. Someone’s name can indicate race, sex, religion, and even 
birthplace in general. In all likelihood, you will classify names—Tyrone, Brett, Emily, 
Precious, Mohamed, Jesus, Jose, Cho—into certain ethnic groups automatically. 
Hence, the Double-Blind System suggests substituting the defendant’s name with 
initials.  
Nevertheless, witnesses, either as groups or individuals, may signal a 
defendant’s characteristics. For example, if a white female came to testify as an alibi 
witness for her son, a juror may conclude the defendant is also white. Alternatively, 
homogenous classes of witnesses may also indicate a defendant’s race. If defense 
counsel calls two friends, a girlfriend, and a pastor—all of whom are black—the judge 
and jury may conclude the defendant is also black. Likewise, if defense counsel calls 
witnesses who only speak Spanish, the jury or judge may conclude the defendant is 
Latino.  
Qualifications may also suggest a defendant’s background. Someone with a BA 
in Physics from Harvard and a PhD in Astrophysics from Columbia may conjure up 
an image of certain ethnicities more readily than others. 
Sites of crimes may also suggest the ethnicity of a defendant. Areas such as 
Chinatown may indicate a defendant is Asian. Cities such as Detroit, Michigan, or 
neighborhoods such as Watts, Los Angeles, California, may indicate a black 
defendant because they generally contain a greater percentage of black residents. 
Likewise, Little Haiti in Miami or Washington Heights in New York may indicate 
Haitian or Dominican defendants.  
Coded language may also uncover traits. For instance, parlance such as “super-
predators” or “thugs” may be commonly interpreted as referring to black males by an 
audience.310 A witness may conceivably use other terms or descriptions, for example, 
the perpetrator had a “thick accent” to convey the defendant is an immigrant. 
Notably, these words on their own have no association to classes such as religion or 
race, but society, and thus a jury, might interpret these terms, correctly or 
erroneously, to mean the defendant is of a particular group. 
                                                 
309  See, e.g., People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 883 (Ct. App. 1991) (“Evidence of defendant’s cultural 
background was clearly relevant on the issue of premeditation and deliberation . . . . Second, the 
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e. Poor Transmission of Image or Audio May Disrupt 
Proceedings 
 
Technical malfunctions are foreseeable with any technology. In Sewell, the 
appellant argued that distortions in a witness’s live testimony via interactive 
television precluded effective cross-examination and impaired the jury’s ability to 
observe the witness.311 Appellant’s second point of error is irrelevant here, as the 
witness testifies only in court, creating an immediate improvement on current 
models. Effective cross-examination is less concerning, again, because the witness 
will be testifying in court in the physical presence of both attorneys. The harm occurs 
when the defendant is momentarily unable to view proceedings, hear proceedings, or 
communicate with defense counsel.  
The court in Sewell distinguished between minor distortions—occasional 
transitory and insignificant static-type interference with the video image and very 
slight time delays between questions and answers—and major technical deficiencies 
that could reasonably be viewed as impairing the right to cross-examination.312 The 
court also noted that time delays that may allow a witness to answer a question before 
a court rules on an objection may occur with live in-court testimony, thus minor 
technological delays do not negate one’s right to cross-examination.313 
In the Double-Blind System, courts may similarly distinguish between minor 
technological deficiencies that do not run afoul of a defendant’s constitutional rights 
and major deficiencies that do. Minor deficiencies may include static; occasional 
visual distortions, such as dropped signals or pixelated images; or occasional drops in 
transmissions including video, audio, or communicative signals. Major deficiencies 
might include a broken microphone, uninterrupted loss of audio or visual signals, or 
a malfunction of defense counsel’s headset throughout trial. If all else fails, the court 
can resort to bringing the defendant back into the courtroom or continuing the trial 
to the next day. If we can communicate with a man on the moon, it seems unlikely 
that such hiccups would prove to be insurmountable.  
 
f. Other Biases  
 
Undoubtedly, other biases will remain. Adjudication is just one of the many 
phases of the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system encompasses biases 
that affect arrests, eyewitness line-ups, discretionary choices in prosecutions, and 
several other situations. This Double-Blind System only reaches a fraction, albeit an 
important part, of the entire criminal justice sequence.  
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IV. WHY SCIENCE BECAME BLIND 
 
The double-blind procedure is the foundation of science and medicine: it is a 
requirement for FDA approval of new drugs, scientists who seek federal grants for 
new studies, and publication in academic journals.314 This procedure likely impacts 
you or a close family member, considering roughly sixty percent of Americans take 
some form of a prescription drug.315  
This procedure became intrinsic to our health and scientific research simply 
because the procedure is shown to eliminate the same problems that pervade our 
courts: biases.316  
During the late eighteenth century, Americans used blind assessment to test 
treatments associated with bias.317 In turn, blind assessments bolstered claims of 
legitimacy and scientific respectability. 318  Blind assessment—in this case actual 
blindfolds on subjects claiming to be mesmerized—definitively proved mesmerism did 
not exist.319 It also showed the human mind may irrationally act on information that, 
in reality, has no causal meaning.320 Consequently, blind assessment has been a 
proven technique to eliminate bias in medicine, rather than simply mitigate its 
effects.321 Historically, patients also held biases towards certain treatments because 
of their knowledge of or expectation of the treatment; today we call this the placebo 
effect.322  
Biases also affect researchers.323 In the nineteenth century, these biases were 
shown across all scientific disciplines. 324  An editorialist at the Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA) in 1909 succinctly explained researcher bias:  
 
The theory of medicine, as of all other sciences, has often been affected 
by the personal equation—that constant error to which each individual 
is subject to a greater or lesser degree. Each observer, though he may be 
able to see facts clearly and even to trace the relation of cause and effect 
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among them to some extent, is liable to error in the interpretation of 
these facts in proportion to the degree of his fixed personal bias . . . .325  
 
A member of the American Medical Association added, “In order to obtain 
trustworthy data, it is necessary . . . [to] eliminate personal bias . . . .”326  
 
V. OTHER APPLICATIONS FOR THE DOUBLE-BLIND SYSTEM 
 
A. Voir Dire 
 
Although not the scope of this Paper, a separate and distinct solution for biases 
that arise during voir dire may also entail an offshoot of the Double-Blind System: a 
voir dire app. As generations become increasingly fluent with technology, this method 
may show extended benefits of blinding attorneys in the courtroom. The app could 
work as follows: first, jurors who have a smartphone may download the app and login 
using encrypted credentials. Jurors who do not have a smart phone may be provided 
a tablet or simple smartphone temporarily by the court. Second, attorneys may 
conduct voir dire as usual, with a few modifications.  
For example, say the first question is, “Have you been a victim of a crime?” On 
the app, a list of crimes will populate and jurors may select an appropriate key, such 
as “A” for assault. A list of responses, anonymous to the attorneys but nevertheless 
certified under oath and recorded by the clerk, will show on a projector or individual 
screens. Attorneys may follow up and ask, “Did you contact the police or did you feel 
the police acted professionally?” Jurors may then use a key indicating “yes” or “no.” 
These explanations will then broadcast to the projector or screens, and attorneys may 
expand the discussion to other jurors by asking, “Does anyone else feel that police 
always act professionally in this encounter?” Jurors may then respond “yes” or “no.” 
Importantly, this will ensure the privacy of the juror and blind the attorneys 
to the physical characteristics of jurors through responses that are not directly traced. 
Jurors will receive randomized numbers or letters that each juror maintains 
throughout voir dire. Attorneys can take corresponding notes, for example, noting 
juror “C” or juror “23” responded, “I wouldn’t trust a police officer if the officer said 
the sky was blue.” Accordingly, the attorney could use a peremptory strike or strike 
that juror for cause. Of course, if attorneys wish to peremptorily strike a juror because 
of behavioral cues, such as lack of eye contact or apparent disinterestedness, the 
attorney may do so. Those behavioral reasons, however, will be entirely divorced from 
responses to questions. This method may ameliorate the concerns of Justice Marshall 
voiced in Batson by blinding attorneys to immutable characteristics that are 
irrelevant in the voir dire process.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Double-Blind System is a versatile procedure that may be implemented in 
various ways. This Paper recommends two potential methods of immediate 
implementation, though it lays the groundwork for wider application in the 
courtroom. In either framework, the Double-Blind System should be used at the 
outset to blind jurors only, not judges. It also should not be used in capital murder 
cases yet, since they involve a balance under the Eighth Amendment that is not 
addressed here.  
First, defendants may opt in and assert their right to use the Double-Blind 
System through a motion. This setup would be accomplished through knowing and 
intelligent waiver, and may be performed today.  
Second, the Double-Blind System may be proposed through legislation as a bright-
line rule that is mandatory in most cases. The legislature may designate cases, such 
as capital murder, where the system is not appropriate.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Double-Blind System will eliminate many biases that currently percolate 
through the criminal courtroom: namely concealed and implicit biases. The system is 
radically different, yet radically simple. In more than one way, the Double-Blind 
System may act as a seatbelt on our often imperceptible and unavoidable biases.  
In the 1950s, the rate of deaths per mile driven was five times higher than it 
is today.327  Scholars offered countless explanations, including faulty cars, poorly 
designed roads, and careless drivers.328 Initially, Ford responded by implementing 
safer steering wheels and padded instrument panels, before realizing “the best fix  
. . . was also the simplest one”: a seatbelt.329 A Ford employee calculated the benefits 
of countless saved lives at relatively no cost and relatively no penalty for drivers who 
wore them. 330  Although consumers initially were offended by seatbelts as they 
considered it a criticism of their driving, nudges gradually resulted in 80 percent 
compliance for wearing seatbelts and reduction in the risk of death by roughly 70 
percent for car passengers.331 
Similarly, the Double-Blind System confronts a broken criminal justice system. 
The product is a prison system in America that ranks as the world’s largest with 
roughly 2.2 million prisoners. 332  Although African Americans constitute just 13 
percent of the nation’s population, they represent 42 percent of those 2.2 million 
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prisoners and 42 percent of the death row population. 333  Although disparate 
treatment abounds in the criminal justice system, countless scholars offer more and 
more complex and costly solutions. Yet, again, the best fix may also be the simplest. 
The Double-Blind System will not eliminate all biases in the criminal justice system, 
nor will it eliminate all biases within the courtroom. But it will significantly reduce 
them, if given the chance. Similarly, judges or jurors may take offense and consider 
the system a criticism on their fairness, but small nudges may indeed significantly 
reduce the habits of acting on implicit bias. This approach is not focused at reducing 
specifically racial or gender bias, but rather it focuses on all biases: current and 
future, concealed and implicit, acceptable and inappropriate. It is a blunt instrument 
that seeks to eradicate all biases, in contrast to other complicated solutions that 
myopically focus on trendy issues such as race.  
Today, more than four out of ten Democrats and Republicans believe the other 
party’s policies pose a threat to the nation. 334  Nearly ninety percent of African 
Americans believe they are lacking in equal rights, whereas only roughly half of 
whites agreed.335 Fear of the other led to the relocation of all Japanese Americans in 
1941, anger led to a 1,700% increase of hate crimes against Muslim Americans 
immediately after 9/11,336 and today, distrust is reaching unprecedented levels.337 
Today, we need a seatbelt more than ever in the one place that serves as a refuge for 
impartiality, fairness, and integrity: the criminal courtroom. That seatbelt is the 
Double-Blind System.  
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